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9.1 Introduction
Take internal relations to be all R such that true predications of R are made true
by intrinsic, non-relational properties of their subjects, and external relations to
be all the rest. If a relation aRb is internal in this sense then we can account for the
truth of ‘aRb’ in terms of the intrinsic properties of a and b, without reifying R.
Token internal relations are not instances of irreducibly relational polyadic
properties; they are relational truths with non-relational truthmakers, hence
reducible. If there are any irreducible relational states in the world, then they
will be found among the external relations. It is not the case, in my view, that
externality is sufficient for irreducibility. That a relational predication ‘aRb’ is not
made true by the intrinsic properties of a and b does not imply that it is not
made true by the intrinsic properties of some thing or things.1 Still, I think it
reasonable to suppose that if a given relation is internal, then its instances do not
involve genuinely relational properties. Assuming height to be intrinsic, given
that Alf is 1.85m tall and Bob is 1.75m tall, ‘Alf is 0.1m taller than Bob’ is made
true by the intrinsic properties of Alf and Bob. We do not need to say in addition
that the ordered pair (Alf, Bob) instantiates a relational property being 0.1m taller
than, and to posit such a property as truthmaker would be otiose.
Some neo-Aristotelians hope to show that causal relations are internal, thereby
reducing such relations to intrinsic properties of their relata.2 Water, they say, has
the intrinsic power to dissolve salt, salt the reciprocal power to be dissolved by
1 See Ch.1.3 in this volume for elaboration.
2 See for instance the papers by Lowe (Ch. 6), Simons (Ch. 7), and Heil (Ch. 8), in this volume;
and Heil (2012), ch. 6.
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water. The cause of the salt’s dissolving in the water is the coming together of
these reciprocal powers, the dissolving of the salt their mutual manifestation. If
causation is the mutual manifestation of powers, which I assume here without
argument, then causal relations are internal only if powers are intrinsic to their
bearers. Those who defend the intrinsicality of powers typically point to the fact
that powers need not manifest in order to be actual, concluding that being
powerful does not require the existence of anything else.3 Powers are directed
towards their manifestations, but do not ontologically depend upon them, and so
are intrinsic to their bearers.
There is a type-token ambiguity, however, in the claim that powers do not
depend on their manifestations. Although a token power does not depend on its
being manifested in order to be actual, the type of which it is a token ontologically
depends upon its manifestation-type, because powers are relationally individu-
ated.4 This raises two problems for the proposed neo-Aristotelian reduction of
causal relations. First, it places the idea that powers are intrinsic in tension with
the Aristotelian commitment to immanent universals. Second, and more ser-
iously, even if the first problem can be solved, the internality of causal relations is
secured only at the expense of type-causal relations which cannot be seen as
internal in the same sense, and which arguably must be reified.
9.2 Powerful Causation as an Internal Relation
Langton and Lewis treat intrinsic properties as those that cannot differ between
duplicates, where x and y are duplicates iff they share all the same basic intrinsic
properties, and P is basic intrinsic iff P is (i) non-disjunctive and contingent, and
(ii) independent of accompaniment. Here, P is independent of accompaniment
iff, possibly (a) there is a lonely P, (b) there is a non-lonely P, (c) there is a lonely
non-P, (d) there is a non-lonely non-P. An object is lonely at a world iff there
exist at its world no other contingent, wholly distinct objects.5 Intuitively, the idea
is that basic intrinsic properties are those natural properties such that having or
lacking them is independent of the existence or non-existence of anything else.
The intrinsic properties of x are its basic intrinsic properties plus whatever other
contingent properties are in common to every possible basic intrinsic duplicate y
3 Heil (2003); Molnar (2003).
4 When, in what follows, I say that powers are relationally individuated, I mean only that they are
at least in part individuated by their relations to each other. Whether or not they are fully so
individuated does not matter for my purposes, and I explain why this is so in section 9.6.
5 According to this definition, an object with proper parts can be lonely. The parts themselves,
provided they do not overlap, will be accompanied by the others.
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of x. I need not endorse this proposal in full generality here. I shall appeal only to
the following necessary condition on intrinsicality: if a property P is intrinsic, then
possibly, there exists a lonely P.6 If the power to dissolve salt is an intrinsic
property of this sample of water, then something could have this power in an
otherwise empty world.
Internal relations are determined by the intrinsic properties of the relata. On
the current conception of intrinsic properties as those that cannot differ between
basic intrinsic duplicates, internal relations are most naturally conceived as those
that cannot differ between ordered n-tuples of basic intrinsic duplicates. Pick any
n-ary relation R you like, and any ordered n-tuple (x1, . . . , xn). If R is an internal
relation, then R(x1, . . . , xn) iff necessarily, for any ordered n-tuple (y1, . . . , yn)
such that for any i, yi is a basic intrinsic duplicate of xi, R(y1, . . . , yn). Duplicate
the relata as to all natural properties that are independent of accompaniment, and
you thereby duplicate any internal relations in which the elements stand.
A consequence of this view—on the assumption that relations that hold in virtue
of basic intrinsic properties of the relata are themselves natural properties—is
that internal relations are also intrinsic to their relata, since they can hold, or fail
to hold, independently of accompaniment, and cannot differ between basic
intrinsic duplicates.7
Several other extant accounts agree that the possibility of loneliness is neces-
sary for intrinsicality. Vallentyne, for instance, argues that intrinsic properties are
those an object x would retain if everything else (objects distinct from x, and even
regions of spacetime not occupied by x) were subtracted from the world.8
Vallentyne analyses intrinsicality not in terms of properties possessed by all
possible duplicates of x, but in terms of properties x itself would retain if
everything else were taken away.9 This account implies that if P is intrinsic to
x, then there could be a lonely P—x itself, once everything that is not x has been
removed. Francescotti analyses intrinsicality in terms of non-relationality—
roughly, properties intrinsic to x are those properties x has but does not have
in virtue of standing in a relation to any object distinct from x, and intrinsic
6 I will question the sufficiency of the above conditions for intrinsicality in section 9.5.
7 See Langton and Lewis (1998), pp. 343–4 for a more detailed argument. As Langton and Lewis
point out, it does not follow that all intrinsic relations are internal. Spatiotemporal relations are
intrinsic, in that they are natural and independent of accompaniment, but they are not obviously
internal. See Lowe (Ch. 6 in this volume) for an argument for the internality of spatiotemporal
relations.
8 Vallentyne (1997).
9 For this reason, Vallentyne requires transworld identity of x and so cannot endorse Lewis’
counterpart-theoretic treatment of modality. Further discussion is beyond the scope of the present
work; see Yablo (1999).
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properties simpliciter are those that are intrinsic to anything that has them.10 If
only accompanied objects can have some property P, then presumably Ps have
P partly in virtue of being accompanied, so P will not come out intrinsic.
Conversely, if P is intrinsic, then Ps need not be accompanied. Witmer, Butchard,
and Trogdon endorse a version of Langton and Lewis’s account that dispenses
with the appeal to naturalness. They argue that an object x has P in an intrinsic
fashion iff (i) P is independent of accompaniment, and (ii) for any property Q, if
x has P in virtue of having Q, then Q is also independent of accompaniment.
A property P is intrinsic iff, necessarily, if x has P, then x has P in an intrinsic
fashion.11 Once more, if P is intrinsic, then possibly, there is a lonely P. The
reason for this consensus on the possibility of loneliness is, I take it, that intrinsic
properties are thought of as those that characterize the way the bearer is, in itself,
regardless of how it relates to anything else.12
If powers are intrinsic, then powerful causation is an internal relation,
although this is not immediately obvious; consider again the example of water
dissolving salt. The water has the power to dissolve the salt, and the salt has
the reciprocal power to be dissolved by the water. When the two are brought
together, these powers mutually manifest as the dissolving of the salt in the water.
But does this not involve spatiotemporal relations? The salt must be immersed in
the water in order for the powers to manifest; many (if not all) powers appear to
have spatiotemporal manifestation conditions. Unless spatiotemporal relations
themselves are internal, it seems powerful causation will be an external relation,
but this is not so. The cause, according to those who endorse powerful causation,
is neither the salt nor the water, but the salt’s immersion in the water; the effect is
the dissolving of the salt. Internal relations hold in virtue of the basic intrinsic
properties of the relata, and the property of being an immersion of salt in water is
plausibly a basic intrinsic property of a complex cause. Nothing in our current
conception of internal relations or intrinsic properties precludes the relata being
intrinsically complex, and having—intrinsically—certain spatiotemporal rela-
tions between their proper parts. For causal relations to come out internal, the
cause relatum must be taken to involve the interaction of reciprocal powers,
which includes their spatiotemporal relatedness.
Mumford and Anjum hold that causes do not necessitate their effects, because
it is possible for preventers to interfere with the manifestation of powers.13 At
10 Francescotti (1999). 11 Witmer, Butchard, and Trogdon (2005).
12 It is interesting to note that all three accounts described in the preceding paragraph entail that
a property P is intrinsic only if it is possible for any of its bearers to have it if lonely. I will return to
this point in section 9.5, when I question the sufficiency of the Langton-Lewis analysis.
13 Mumford and Anjum (2011), esp. ch. 3.
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first blush, it may seem as though the above conception of causation as an
internal relation requires that causes do necessitate their effects, since I hold
that internal relations could not possibly fail to hold between basic intrinsic
duplicates of the relata. However, suppose we mask the reciprocal dispositions of
the salt and water, perhaps by wrapping the salt in watertight plastic. Or again,
suppose—to use Mumford and Anjum’s example—that a match is struck in
such a way that all factors required for it to light are present, but a sudden gust
of wind prevents its lighting. Mumford and Anjum argue for an ‘antecedent
strengthening’ test of necessitation: if A necessitates B, then for any f, if A and f,
then B. Causation fails this test, since any cause can occur without its effect if an
appropriate preventer occurs.
I need not take issue with Mumford and Anjum’s claim that such examples
show that causes do not necessitate their effects. I am concerned only with
whether they show that powerful causation is external. Being wrapped in plastic
is an extrinsic property of the salt; being struck during a sudden gust of wind is an
extrinsic property of the match. But now it seems that not every basic intrinsic
duplicate of the salt will dissolve in the water, and not every basic intrinsic
duplicate of the match will light when struck. A tempting thought, but, I think,
a mistake. Focus on the salt and water example. As I have already explained, the
dissolving of the salt by the water is an internal causal relation only if we take the
cause to be the immersion of the salt in the water, holding fixed, of course, that
the water has the power to dissolve the salt and the salt the corresponding
reciprocal power. Wrapping the salt in plastic changes the basic intrinsic prop-
erties of the cause, and so is no counterexample to the internality of causal
relations.
What I am claiming here is that an extrinsic property of the salt itself—being
wrapped in plastic, which it could not have if it were lonely—will count as an
intrinsic property of the relevant cause relatum, the salt’s being immersed in the
water. The same goes for the gust of wind which would have prevented the
lighting of the match—extrinsic to the striking of the match, which may occur in
many different ways, but intrinsic to the cause event, which will include all the
powers whose mutual manifestation on this occasion result in its lighting. As Heil
notes, we can alter the ways in which powers manifest by adding further powers
into the mix, but this does not mean that powerful causation is external, because
the additional powers—the preventers, in Mumford and Anjum’s terminology—
alter the intrinsic properties of the relata.14 If we are careful enough to duplicate
14 Heil, ‘Causal Relations’, Ch. 8 in this volume.
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the basic intrinsic properties of salt and water, of match, matchbox, and atmos-
phere, then we are bound to be at a world where no preventers occur.
Note that those who take causal relations to be internal need not reject
Mumford and Anjum’s view that causes do not necessitate their effects. If we
take events to be modally robust, then altering the intrinsic properties of a cause
so as to prevent its effect need not prevent the occurrence of the cause. However,
if antecedent strengthening fails only in cases where preventers alter the intrinsic
properties of causes, the failure of the prevented effect to occur does not count
against the internality of the causal relation. Internality does not require that
causes necessitate their effects, but only that the occurrence of cause and effect in
a particular way necessitates that they are related as cause and effect.
9.3 Are Powers Intrinsic?
The question I address in this section is: if powers have relational essences, how
can they be intrinsic?15 Powers are relationally individuated in two senses: it is in
the nature of a given power that there are specific partner powers with which it
must be combined in order to manifest, and each combination of partner powers
has a specific manifestation type or types.16 The powers ontology is typically seen
as a form of structuralism, in that powers are individuated by their places in a
relational structure.17 Weaker forms of powers ontology, such as Heil’s powerful
qualities theory, also plausibly require that powers have at least partially rela-
tional essences. Powers, for Heil, are essentially related both to their partner
powers, and the manifestation types that result from their various combinations.
True, Heil thinks that powers are also qualities, in that they can be thought of
(through ‘partial consideration’) in non-relational terms.18 However, it is not in
virtue of our ways of thinking about powers that they are such as to combine with
their partner powers to yield certain manifestations. As Heil himself says, “[i]n
15 An anonymous referee points out to me that Tugby (2013) employs arguments similar to those
found in this section to argue that dispositionalists must embrace Platonism about universals if they
want to maintain that powers are intrinsic. The arguments of this paper were developed independ-
ently, and while I agree that Platonism is one way to secure the intrinsicality of powers, I do not
think it is the only way.
16 If all properties are powers, then this is double dependence on powers. I speak in what follows
as if the manifestations of powers were instances of further powers, but nothing for present purposes
turns on this.
17 Bird (2007a, b).
18 Heil (2012), ch. 4 and (2003). Sphericality, for instance, can be characterized non-relation-
ally—as a property satisfying a certain mathematical formula—or in terms of the way it combines
with other powerful properties to yield manifestations such as rolling.
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virtue of being as it is, each power would manifest itself in a particular way with
particular kinds of reciprocal partner.”19 Having certain partner powers and
manifestation types are part of the essential nature of each power. The power
to dissolve salt is of its nature both directed towards the dissolution of salt as a
manifestation type, and has the solubility of salt as a partner power. As Bird
notes, that powers are relational in this sense does not imply that powers are
relational properties of their bearers. Powers are second-order relational, but first-
order intrinsic—essentially related to other powers at type-level, but intrinsic to
their bearers.20
The kind of dependence of powers on reciprocal powers and manifestations
sketched above is second-order in the following sense: a given power depends on
the existence of its reciprocal partner powers and its possible manifestation types,
but not on its actually combining with the former to bring about the latter. I now
give an example to clarify the sort of dependencies we see in physics. Consider the
time-dependent Schrödinger equation for a single particle moving in a radial
electromagnetic potential V:
iħ
@Ψðr; tÞ
@t
¼ H^Ψðr; tÞ ½where H^ ¼  ħ
2
2m
∇2 þ VðrÞ
Ψ is the particle’s wave function, interpreted physically as encoding a probability
distribution. The term on the left hand side represents the total energy of the
particle, and the two terms of the Hamiltonian operator Ĥ represent its kinetic
and potential energies, in turn.21 To derive Ĥ for a particular case we need to
specify the nature of the potential V in which the particle moves. For instance, for
an electron orbiting a positively charged nucleus of atomic number Z, we
substitute the Coulomb potential for V(r) to get:22
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Once Ĥ and appropriate boundary conditions are specified, we can solve for Ψ
and use the Born rule to calculate the probability distribution over various
measurement outcomes (position, momentum, etc.). Now suppose that funda-
mental physical properties are powers, and that which powers they are is fully
described by completed physical science. This being the case, we can read off the
19 Heil (2012), p. 75. 20 Bird (2007b).
21 ▽2Ψ ¼ ð@2=@x2 þ @2=@y2 þ @2=@z2ÞΨ: The details are unimportant here.
22 The Coulomb potential V between two point charges q1 and q2 is given by V=keq1q2/r, where
ke is Coulomb’s constant. Again, details are unimportant for present purposes.
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ontological dependencies from the appropriate equations. Write down the fun-
damental laws involving a given property P. P ontologically depends on any
property Q that you cannot but refer to in framing those laws, and any properties
upon which Q depends in this manner. If the Schrödinger equation above (at
least partially) specifies which powers mass and charge are, then mass and charge
are mutually ontologically dependent. They are interdefined in terms of the way
in which an electromagnetic potential, generated by a charge, alters the wave
function of a particle with a certain mass and kinetic energy. In order to specify
which power mass is, we must refer to charge, and vice versa. It follows that
neither mass nor charge could be the power it is unless the other also existed.
This immediately raises the worry that powers cannot be intrinsic if we
suppose, with Aristotle, that powers are immanent: that for a power to exist at
a world, there must be at least one thing in the history of that world that has it. If
the identity of mass, qua power, is (partially) described by a law relating it (inter
alia) to charge, and this law requires the existence of charge as a partial truth-
maker, and the existence of a property at a world requires that something there
has it, then for anything to be massive, something must be charged. The converse
is of course also true. If our current conception of intrinsic properties is correct,
then a property P is intrinsic only if there is a lonely P. For Aristotelians, however,
it seems there will not be any lonely empowered particulars at all, assuming every
power ontologically depends upon at least one other. For anything to possess a
given power, there must exist at its world bearers of all the other powers involved
in its relational individuation.23
Let us take stock. If powers are ontologically dependent on each other, then the
existence of a power at a world requires the existence of those powers upon which
it depends. But for Aristotelians, a power exists at a world only if it has instances
at that world, so for any x to possess a power P, theremust exist bearers of all powers
uponwhich P depends. But in that case P is not intrinsic, because Ps are not possibly
lonely. Think of it this way: Aristotelians cannot help themselves to Bird’s idea that
powers are second-order relational but first-order intrinsic, because the second-
order relations cannot obtain without first-order relata. There are two broad strat-
egies available at this point: (A) reject relational individuation, keeping hold of the
Aristotelian commitment to immanent universals; (B) keep relational individuation,
and either reject immanence, or find a way to make relational individuation,
23 Nothing I have said thus far suggests that powers are relational properties, and I do not think
they are. My point thus far has merely been to raise doubts concerning the intrinsicality of
immanent powers, stemming from the supposition that they are relationally individuated. I shall
have more to say about this presently.
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immanence and intrinsicality compatible. Let us now consider these strategies in
turn, starting with the idea that powers might be somehow self-contained.
9.4 Self-Contained Powers
Some deny that powers are relationally individuated, and if they are not, then
neither are they ontologically dependent upon each other. Marmodoro, for instance,
claims that the manifestation of a power is a distinct state of the power itself, rather
than a numerically distinct property.24 Powers so conceived ontologically depend
only upon their reciprocal partner powers for their identities—upon which powers
they must be combined with to get them from potentiality to activation. In some
cases, however, it seems that the partner powers are just further instances of the
same power in potentiality. Suppose we say that the power to heat is activated by the
heating body possessing greater heat than the heated body, and that its activation
consists in its heating that body. This does not seem to involve any powers other
than heat itself. I do not think this theory is plausible for heat when one considers
the physical mechanisms that realize heating, but will not argue the point here,
because I think it is perfectly clear that at least some fundamental powers have
numerically distinct properties as their manifestation types.
For simplicity, let us think in terms of classical mechanics, in which the
exertion of a given force accelerates a body at a rate determined by its inertial
mass. Suppose we say that the essence of charge consists in generating an electric
field, and the electric field generated by a given charge is simply a measure of the
mutual force it and a unit charge would exert upon each other. Now it appears
(reifying forces for the sake of argument) that we may conceive of charge as the
power to exert a force on other charged particles, where (i) the exertion of such a
force is charge in its activated state rather than in potentiality, and (ii) the
reciprocal partner power of charge is another charged particle at a certain
separation. No properties other than charge seem to be required to specify the
essential nature of charge. This view seems plausible until we ask: what is it to
exert a force? If charge is the power to exert forces on other charges, where the
exertion of such a force is charge in its activated state, and force derives its
identity (at least partially) from the acceleration it produces per unit mass, then
charge in its activated state ontologically depends upon mass.25
24 See Marmodoro (forthcoming a).
25 This point is not restricted to classical mechanics. The time-dependent Schrödinger equation
discussed in section 9.3 can be seen in the same light, with the effect of a Coulomb potential on the
wave function of a charged particle likewise dependent upon the mass of the particle.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/10/2015, SPi
 DAVID YATES
Something has gone wrong. We wanted to treat charge as a power that comes
in (at least) two states: in potentiality, and exerting a Coulomb force, but when in
the second state, charge accelerates the bodies upon which it exerts a force, at a
rate depending (inter alia) on their masses. This dependency suggests that the
manifestation of charge cannot be an activated state of charge itself. It is far
more plausible to hold that mass, charge, and force are distinct reciprocal partner
powers among whose mutual manifestation types are accelerations. There is
simply nothing we can plausibly identify as the self-contained manifestation
type of each partner power, when taken individually. Note that this argument
does not depend on reification of forces, and is in fact clearer without it. If forces
are fictions, then the only candidate manifestations of charge in cases of classical
Coulombic interactions are the accelerations of charged particles, which cannot
be regarded as activated states of charge.
Perhaps there is another way for powers to be self-contained. Recall Alf and
Bob, who are 1.85m and 1.75m tall respectively, but suppose in addition that they
have their heights essentially. Suppose further—uncontroversially—that all
essential properties are necessary. It follows that wherever Alf and Bob both
exist, Alf is 0.1m taller than Bob. Alf and Bob could each exist without the other,
but wherever both exist, they stand in a specific relation, in virtue of their
essential intrinsic properties. Interestingly, the same is arguably true of certain
properties. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that sphericality is the property
of being an x such that all points on x’s surface are equidistant from a fixed point.
In virtue of having this property, spheres are thus-and-so disposed—the spheri-
cality of a rigid material body contributes to its disposition to roll down an inclined
plane in a gravitational field, for instance. To echo Shoemaker, we might even
describe sphericality as the power to roll conditionally on being massive, rigid, on
an inclined plane and in a gravitational field.26
Here is the key point: assuming powers to be relationally individuated, then
given immanent universals, sphericality cannot be this conditional power at
worlds where mass, rigidity, and gravitation do not exist. Why not? Suppose—
again for the sake of argument—that there is a possible world W containing no
instances of mass or rigidity, and no gravitational fields, but at which there are
massless bodies such that all points on their surfaces are equidistant from a fixed
point. Arguing for this point in detail would take us too far afield, so let us simply
agree with the intuition that such bodies are spherical.27 AtW sphericality cannot
26 Shoemaker (1980).
27 This is harmless because I am appealing to sphericality for illustrative purposes only, and in any
case do not endorse the theory of powers as self-contained which will emerge from the illustration.
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be the power to roll down an inclined plane in a gravitational field conditionally
on being massive and rigid, because it is arguably not true at W that for any x, if x
were massive, rigid, and spherical, x would roll down an inclined plane in a
gravitational field. Some of the truthmakers of the counterfactuals that describe
sphericality’s causal contributions at our world are missing fromW. If we want to
say that sphericality is a conditional power around here, we had better say that it
is only contingently, hence accidentally, the conditional power it actually is.
Perhaps this conclusion can be generalized to all powers. Here is how the
theory might go. For Aristotelians to maintain that powers are intrinsic proper-
ties, and hence that powerful causation is an internal relation, they can hold that
powers are accidentally the powers they are, and so are not ontologically
dependent upon each other. Sphericality is the property of being an x such that
all points on x’s surface are equidistant from a fixed point. At our world, because
mass, rigidity, and the like exist, sphericality combines, in virtue of being the
property it is, with those other properties, to manifest as rolling under certain
circumstances. Sphericality, mass, and rigidity are such that wherever they all
exist, things will roll. But it does not follow that any of them, considered in
isolation from the others, is the power to do anything. Sphericality is a certain
power at our world, we might say, partly in virtue of the other properties that
exist around here. There are lonely powers in the sense that properties that are
contingently powers around here can be instantiated by lonely particulars, and in
such cases they fail to be the powers they are at our world—because they fail to be
powers at any world.
It is easy to believe that sphericality is only accidentally a power, because the
following claims are intuitively true: (i) we can capture its nature in non-
relational terms, (ii) we can do this in a way that makes it transparent why
sphericality causally relates in the way it does to properties such as mass and
rigidity. Unfortunately, we cannot do the same for physical properties such as
mass and charge: our most fundamental characterizations of such properties
describe them solely in terms of causal-nomic relations to each other. Perhaps
mass, like sphericality, is a qualitative property which—in virtue of being the
property it is—necessarily combines with other properties in a certain way.28
28 Compare Jacobs’ (2011) theory of fundamental properties as powerful qualities. Jacobs con-
ceives such qualities as rich, non-mental qualitative natures, which, in virtue of being the qualitative
natures they are, are partial truthmakers of certain counterfactuals (those, I take it, that are deducible
from physical laws). The claim that fundamental properties such as mass and charge are qualitative
counterfactual truthmakers, however, leaves open whether the qualities are (a) essentially powers
and ontologically dependent upon each other, or (b) accidentally powers and ontologically inde-
pendent. Jacobs does not say which.
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However, the two cases are importantly different. We can say which property
sphericality is without reference to the properties with which it combines, at our
world, to yield rolling. However, we are at a loss to say which property mass is
without saying what it does. Physical science, as is by now familiar, conceives
physical properties in purely structural terms, and that is precisely to conceive
them in a way that undermines the view that they could be accidental powers. If
physical powers are only accidentally the powers they are, then we cannot say
which properties they are essentially. Mass, charge, and the like—if they are only
accidentally powers—are essentially ineffable.
There are two further problems with the current theory. First, the idea that a
property could be a power and yet have its causal role accidentally will seem to
many to be a contradiction in terms. Sphericality has its causal role in virtue of
being the property it is, and it arguably does not possess that role essentially, but
this does not imply that sphericality is an accidental power, it implies that
sphericality is not a power at all. Powers are individuated by their causal roles,
and do not possess those roles in virtue of a prior, self-contained qualitative
essence. Second, and relatedly, is that it is far from clear that accidental powers
could stand in internal causal relations. It is certainly possible for individuals such
as Alf and Bob to stand in internal relations in virtue of their essential natures,
without thereby having relational essences, but this does not show that a set of
self-contained properties could stand in internal causal relations solely in virtue
of being the properties they are. In fact, the case of sphericality, to which
I appealed to make the theory seem plausible, depends on the prior assumption
that mass, for instance, already has its causal role. In virtue of what, though?
Those who take mass to be a power will be inclined to say: in virtue of nothing at
all, and that is why mass is a power, while sphericality is not. So much for the idea
that powers might be thought of as self-contained properties, ontologically
independent of each other.
9.5 Relational Individuation, Immanence,
and Intrinsicality
Our problem is that Aristotelian immanence, given the relational individuation
of powers, seems to imply that Aristotelian powers cannot be instantiated by
lonely particulars, hence that they are not intrinsic. One option at this point is to
embrace a transcendental conception of powers. Amongst those who endorse
ontologies of powers, some are more sympathetic to Platonism than others. Bird,
for instance, thinks there are certain advantages to transcendent powers, but
takes his central thesis—that powers are intrinsic truthmakers for the laws of
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nature—to be compatible with immanence as well.29 Heil, on the other hand,
rejects Platonism.30 For Heil, there are particular substances and particular
modes—things, and ways things are. We can abstract away from a red tomato’s
shape, size, location, and so forth, to get to its redness, just as we can abstract
away from its properties to get to the underlying substance, but abstractions do
not exist in Plato’s heaven; indeed, they do not really exist anywhere. It is unclear
whether abstracting from particular ways of being provides us with mind-
independent universals, but what is clear is that there are no uninstantiated
powers in Heil’s ontology. As Heil puts it, “Statements concerning universals
can be true, but their truthmakers are wholly particular. Universals, as Armstrong
would say, involve ‘no addition to being’.”31 Take two red tomatoes. We can
abstract away from all the other features of each tomato to get to their colours,
and we find these properties to be exactly resembling. However, for Heil, exact
resemblance as to colour does not require a shared universal, or any property
over and above the particular ways of being coloured of the tomatoes.
Despite their unattractiveness to Aristotelians, transcendent powers can cer-
tainly secure the intrinsicality of powers against their relational individuation.
Platonists typically hold that universals are abstract and exist at any possible
world, regardless of whether they have instances there. On this view, for any
power P, there could be a lonely P at some world W, because the other powers
upon which P depends are bound to exist at W. In one sense, of course, P is not
lonely, because it is accompanied by the other powers in relation to which it is
individuated. However, this is not the kind of accompaniment that would render
P extrinsic. The key point is that given transcendent powers, a concrete particular
need not be accompanied by any other concrete particulars in order to possess P,
which renders the relational individuation of powers consistent with their in-
trinsicality. Powers, on this view, are individuated by their places in an abstract
relational structure, but are nonetheless intrinsic to their bearers, which need not
stand in any relations in order to instantiate them.32
Perhaps there is a way for Aristotelians to square the intrinsicality of powers
with their relational individuation without abandoning immanence. The key, one
might suspect, lies in coinstantiation of powers. Roughly, for any powers P and Q,
29 Bird (2007a). 30 Heil (2012), ch. 5.
31 Heil (2012), p. 104. Lowe also rejects Platonism on the grounds that universals are abstractions
from particular modes of substances. Qua abstractions, universals are not located anywhere—
neither in Plato’s Heaven, nor in their instances. As with Heil, is difficult to see how Lowe could
allow for uninstantiated universals.
32 Bird (2007b). Bird holds that powers are the nodes of an asymmetric graph structure whose
vertices are stimulus and manifestation relations, with the identities of the nodes determined by the
structure.
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there will be a lonely P even if P depends on Q and there are no uninstantiated
powers, provided there is a lonely P and Q. For all their mutual ontological
dependence, there does exist a lonely charge, and a lonely mass: it is a lonely
electron. Electrons have both charge and mass, so provided neither property
depends on any further property that electrons lack, the mutual dependence of
charge and mass does not preclude their intrinsicality. In general, mutual
dependence is consistent with intrinsicality and the rejection of Platonism pro-
vided any properties P1, . . . , Pn that depend on each other are possibly coinstan-
tiated. Supposing for the sake of argument that mass and charge depend on each
other and upon no other properties, the existence of electrons guarantees that
both are intrinsic. There is at least one counterintuitive consequence of this
theory. First, note that there are things that have mass but no charge—neutrinos,
for example.33 If we need coinstantiation to explain how ontological dependence
is consistent with intrinsicality, we are forced to say there could not be a lonely
massive neutrino, because such a neutrino would need to exist at a world
containing no charge to help individuate its mass, which violates the mutual
dependency of mass and charge.
The counterintuitive consequence is that mass is an intrinsic power of neutri-
nos because there exists a lonely electron. Surely, one might object, if mass is
intrinsic to this neutrino, then it is not enough that there exists a lonely mass—it
should be possible for the neutrino to be that mass. However, if the above
speculation on the mutual dependence of mass and charge is correct, then for a
neutrino to have mass, something must be charged, and it cannot be the neutrino.
Langton and Lewis’s analysis implies, in the current context, that some intrinsic
properties are such that not everything that has them could have them if lonely.
Mass is basic intrinsic because it is a perfectly natural property that is independ-
ent of accompaniment—there is a lonely mass, which is also charged, therefore
not a neutrino. If mass is an intrinsic property simpliciter, however, then
the neutrino’s mass is intrinsic to it, despite the fact that its having mass requires
the existence of a numerically distinct charged particle.34
The trouble with this result is that we are inclined to think of intrinsic
properties as those that characterize the way its bearers are, independently of
33 The three kinds of neutrino recognized as fundamental particles in the standard model each
have non-zero mass and zero electric charge. I speak of neutrinos here rather than neutrons because
neutrons are composed of three quarks, each having fractional electric charges that add up to zero.
Wherever neutrons exist, something is charged, but the common charged particulars are proper
parts of the neutron and so not distinct from it.
34 Have I not assumed, in the preceding argument, that neutrinos themselves could not possibly
be charged? Yes, but no matter. It is equally counterintuitive to suppose that a neutral neutrino
having its mass intrinsically depends on the possibility of a charged neutrino.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/10/2015, SPi
IS POWERFUL CAUSATION AN INTERNAL RELATION? 
anything else. If mass can only be instantiated by an accompanied neutrino, then
what does it matter that some possibly lonely things, such as electrons, have it?
In contrast to Langton and Lewis’s account, all three alternative accounts of
intrinsicality discussed earlier in section 9.2 imply that mass is extrinsic, under
our present assumptions. According Witmer, Butchard, and Trogdon, mass will
come out extrinsic, because a neutrino has mass partly in virtue of being
accompanied by something charged, and being so accompanied is not independ-
ent of accompaniment, so something massive—a neutrino—fails to have mass in
an intrinsic fashion. Vallentyne’s account has the same consequence. According
to his theory, if mass is intrinsic, then anything massive would retain its mass if
everything else were taken away. Neutrinos fail this test. Further, since neutrinos
have mass partly in virtue of standing in the relation of being accompanied to
something charged, Francescotti’s theory also entails that mass is extrinsic.
The moral is that for Aristotelians, whatever powers a given power
P ontologically depends upon had better be powers that all possible bearers of
P possess; that something has both the dependent power and the power upon
which it depends is not sufficient. We can still render this sort of dependency
consistent with immanent universals, however, provided we strengthen the
coinstantiation thesis so that powers same-subject metaphysically necessitate all
other powers upon which they depend. For charge to be the property it is, mass
must exist for individuative purposes. If in addition (i) charge is intrinsic, (ii)
there are no uninstantiated properties, and (iii) nothing has its intrinsic proper-
ties in virtue of anything else, then (iv) charge must same-subject necessitate
mass. The empirical fact that we never observe massless charges may be a
consequence of this deeper metaphysical dependency.
Unfortunately, this theory implies that mass does not depend upon charge,
because although we do not see any massless charges in nature, we see plenty of
neutral masses—the neutrino being an example. We have solved the problem
posed by the lonely neutrino by denying that mass depends on charge. Perhaps
this is true, but pause for a moment to reflect on the consequences if it is.
I suggested in section 9.3 that we could read off ontological dependencies from
fundamental laws, but if the current theory is correct, this is not so. The
Schrödinger equation for a particle moving in an electromagnetic field suggest
that mass and charge are mutually ontologically dependent, but they are clearly
not mutually necessitating. Whichever power mass is, it cannot be the power
to do all that Schrödinger’s equation says it does.35 If it were, then mass
would ontologically depend on charge, which, given the strong version of the
35 The same argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to any laws relating mass to charge.
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coinstantiation thesis, means there could be no neutral masses. Since there are
neutral masses, the way in which mass interacts with charge cannot be indivi-
duative of mass.
The only way I can see to avoid this sort of result, holding on to relational
individuation, immanence, and intrinsicality, is to reject the idea that loneliness is
a necessary condition for intrinsicality. On this view, a power P is intrinsic to
its bearers and yet requires the existence of other particulars as bearers of any
powers upon which P ontologically depends. Consider again the neutrino, which
cannot be lonely on the assumption that mass ontologically depends on charge.
The fact that neutrino x, in order that its mass m be individuated, requires the
existence of some particle y with some charge q, stems not from the fact that x’s
having mass is a property that somehow involves x standing in a relation to y, but
from the fact that m is partially individuated by certain dispositional relations to
q. Perhaps the right thing to say is that loneliness is a suitable necessary condition
for intrinsicality only if one is Humean about causality; for Aristotelians, a
different account is needed. I will not take on the challenge of supplying such
an account here, because none of the proposed ways of reconciling relational
individuation with intrinsicality, I shall now argue, is of use to the Aristotelian
who wishes to argue that causal relations are not genuine relational properties.
9.6 Conclusion: The Irreducibility
of Causality to Powers
In section 9.4, I considered two notions of self-contained powers: (a) power
manifestations as further states of the powers themselves; (b) powers as acciden-
tally the powers they are, but essentially ineffable. I argued that (a) failed to apply
to physical properties such as mass and charge, and that (b) was not really a
theory of powers at all. In section 9.5, I considered three ways of reconciling the
relational individuation of powers with their intrinsicality: (i) powers as tran-
scendent universals; (ii) powers as dependent only on properties they same-
subject necessitate; (iii) powers as intrinsic on some understanding of ‘intrinsic’
that does not require loneliness. I consider (iii) to be by far the most promising of
these options, but set that aside. Securing intrinsicality in any one of these ways
may be sufficient to show that token causal relations are internal, but not that
causation itself is reducible.
That Alf is 0.1m taller than Bob is an internal relation, requiring no relational
property to be instantiated by the ordered pair (Alf, Bob). ‘Alf is 0.1m taller than
Bob’ is made true by the intrinsic heights of Alf and Bob, and so is not an
irreducibly relational state of Alf and Bob. Arguing against the reducibility of
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asymmetric transitive relations in general, Russell pointed out that in order to
argue this way, we must still posit a relation between the magnitude of Alf ’s
height and the magnitude of Bob’s height.36 The case for the internality of taller
than rests depends on arithmetical relations, in this case the fact that 1.85 is 0.1
greater than 1.75, which is a further asymmetric transitive relation. This does not
mean that Alf ’s being 0.1m taller than Bob involves Alf and Bob standing in an
irreducible, external relation. However, if Russell is correct, we will not be able to
apply this strategy to show that all relations are internal, for it is not at all obvious
that the greater than relation between magnitudes can be treated in the same way
as the taller than relation between Alf and Bob. There are, it seems, no intrinsic
properties of magnitudes in virtue of which they stand in the relations they do.
All is not lost in the case of taller than, which we have still reduced to a more
fundamental greater than relation between magnitudes. In the case of powerful
causation, I submit, things are not so straightforward. While there are ways to
reconcile the relational individuation of powers with their intrinsicality, they all
presuppose individuative type-level relations between the powers themselves.
The prospects for a reduction of causation begin to look bleak when one reflects
on the fact that the individuative relations posited are type-level correlates of the
token causal relations we were trying to reduce. Those who treat powerful
causation as an internal relation must endorse some form of powers theory of
causation. According to one such theory, causes are token comings together of
reciprocal powers, effects their token mutual manifestations. However, once we
allow that those powers are individuated by their potential for combining with
other powers and manifesting in this way, then we succeed in reducing token
causal relations only by presupposing type-level relations of the same kind.
This is certainly a reduction, but it is important to note the kind of reduction it
is—of actual causal relations to potential causal relations, not of causality itself. It
is not clear, unless one is prepared to deny that powers are relationally individu-
ated at all, that we can eliminate all causal relations by embracing a powers
theory. Perhaps one might suggest that the individuative structural relations
between powers are internal. Well, what could that mean? Certainly not that
such relations are determined by intrinsic properties of the powers, for in that
case (i) we should have to posit second-order properties of powers, and (ii) the
question would arise as to how those properties ground the first-order relations,
and the same problem would simply recur at the second-order, leading to a
regress. There are other notions of internality available, for instance Bradley’s
idea that internal relations are essential to the relata, and this seems much closer
36 Russell (1903); see esp. }214.
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to the truth about relational individuation.37 If relations that are internal in this
sense are also somehow reducible in that they do not require relational properties
as truthmakers, then the reductionists are home and dry. Let us therefore briefly
consider whether relations that are internal in this second sense are reducible.
Consider the following three grades of internal relatedness, focusing on the
taller than relation. First case. Alf and Bob are contingently 1.85m and 1.75m tall
respectively. Necessarily, if both Alf and Bob exist and have their actual intrinsic
properties, Alf is taller than Bob. Second case. Suppose in addition that Alf and
Bob have their heights essentially, and that all essential properties are necessary.
In this case, necessarily, if both Alf and Bob exist, Alf is taller than Bob. It does
not follow that they are essentially related, because either could exist without the
other. In both the first and second cases, taller than is plausibly an internal
relation in the sense that it is determined by the intrinsic properties of the relata,
and hence is reducible. Third case. To get Bradleyan internality, we need to
suppose that it is part of the essential nature of both Alf and Bob that Alf is
taller than Bob. It does not follow that Alf and Bob have their heights essentially,
as there are indefinitely many ways for Alf to be taller than Bob. What follows
now is that necessarily, wherever either Alf or Bob exists, they both exist, and are
such that Alf is taller than Bob. This, I take is, is analogous to the ontological
dependence that results from the relational individuation of powers.
Now it is tempting to suppose that even in the third case, taller than is internal
in both Bradley’s essentialist sense and in the sense required by the reductionist,
but this is a mistake. If Alf and Bob are essentially such that Alf is taller than Bob,
then their heights are (arguably) not intrinsic. It is metaphysically impossible
for Alf to be 1.85m tall at worlds where Bob is 1.9m tall, for instance. In order to
have any particular height, Alf must first stand in the taller than relation to
Bob. Neither can have a particular height independently of the height of the
other, because neither can exist unless they stand in the appropriate relative
height relation. This of course sounds wildly implausible, but that is just because
concrete particulars are not essentially related by relations such as taller than. If
they were, it would follow that height were not intrinsic, due to the ontological
priority of relative height. My point here is that the cost of a relational essence is
the metaphysical fundamentality of the individuating relations. If a given relation
is ontologically prior to its relata, then it can be treated as neither determined by,
nor reducible to, their intrinsic properties.
37 Bradley (1897). See, for instance, his claim at p. 347 that a relation “essentially penetrates the
being of its terms.” For more on Bradley’s view that relations are internal in this sense, see Ch. 1.3 in
this volume.
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It is controversial whether relations could be prior to their relata, and one might
suspect an incoherence in the very idea. In an ontology of pure powers, writes Lowe:
[N]o property can get its identity fixed, because each property owes its identity to another,
which, in turn owes its identity to another—and so on, in a way that, very plausibly,
generates either a vicious infinite regress or a vicious circle.38
I am inclined to agree, but the problem Lowe raises targets only the claim that
powers are wholly individuated by their relations to each other. It seems clear that
we can solve Lowe’s regress problem by allowing some non-powers into the
ontology—that is, by allowing that some of the properties in the relational
structure that individuates powers have their identities determined independ-
ently of their own places in that structure. Bird agrees:
If we trace the chain of dependencies, from the essence of one essentially dispositional
property to another, we will eventually come across essentially dispositional properties
whose manifestations or stimuli are characterized not in terms of yet further essentially
dispositional properties but in categorical terms instead. Since these have their identities
primitively, they serve to determine the identities of all the properties in the structure.39
The issue of the reducibility of causation does not turn on whether or not powers
need type-level relations to both powers and non-powers in order to be properly
individuated. The ontological primacy of relations remains, whether the ontology
is pure or mixed; all that changes are the natures of (some of) the relata. Put
differently: what is at stake in the debate over the coherence of pure powers
ontologies is not whether structure could be ontologically basic, but whether
everything ontologically basic could be structure. In any powers ontology,
I submit, type-level causal relations to other properties—whether or not these
latter are individuated outside the structure or within it—will be ontologically
prior to the powers, hence irreducible. Powerful causation reduces token-causal
relations to intrinsic powers only at the expense of the irreducible type-level
causal relations needed to individuate the powers. Absent a plausible theory of
self-contained powers, powerful causation does not make good on its promise to
provide non-relational truthmakers for all the causal truths.40
38 Lowe (2006a), p. 138. I have assumed a finite set of mutually dependent properties here for
simplicity, but an infinite regress of ontological dependencies, as Bird argues in his (2007b), is no
better than a circle. See Ladyman (Ch. 11 in this volume) for a defence of purely relational
individuation in ontic structural realism.
39 Bird (2007b), p. 526.
40 Based on research funded by the European Research Council. Early versions of some of the
arguments of this paper were presented, on two separate occasions, at Oxford. Thanks to John Heil,
Ross Inman, Jonathan Lowe, Brian Prince, Célia Teixeira, and Alastair Wilson for helpful comments
and criticisms.
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